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(E0055)

3/12/92 : Language NEA's Libby Ward: Prepared for
DAS Schaeffer's Hearing Today before Cong. Hamilton's
Subcommittee

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 1/27/93

Provided to PM/PRO's Tom Praster for A/S Clarke's
EO Citations 3/13/92 JEC Testimony

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Q. What are we doing to ensure that China is not assisting
Iran with the development of nuclear weapons?

A. We have long had concerns about Iran's nuclear intentions.
As a result, the US engages in no nuclear cooperation with
Iran and we have urged other nuclear suppliers, including
China, to adopt a similar policy.

o U/S Bartholomew delivered this message to Chinese Vice
Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu while in Beijing in June 1991.
Secretary Baker conveyed this message during his visit to
Beijing last November, and, just this week, Under Secretary
Kanter stressed our concerns to visiting PRC Vice Foreign
Minister Liu Huaqiu.

o We have been aware for some time that China engages in
nuclear cooperation with Iran. We cannot comment publicly
on this cooperation, as any detailed discussion of it would
require the use of intelligence information.

-- China has announced that it has transferred to Iran an
electromagnetic separator for isotope production and a
small nuclear research reactor.

-- China's nuclear assistance projects in Iran have
credible civilian applications, but could over time
provide Iran with the experience needed to support
weapons development.

o We note that an IAEA team, during its recent visit to Iran,
inspected some Chinese-origin equipment and facilities and
determined that they were being used for peaceful
purposes. The IAEA Team's findings do not, however, allay
our long-term concerns regarding Iran's nuclear intentions.

o *Insert A*
PRC nuclear assistance to Iran does not necessarily violate
China's NPT obligations. Given concerns about Tehran's
ambitions, however, we will continue to remind China that
engaging in any form of nuclear cooperation with Iran,
whether under safeguards or not is, in our view, highly
imprudent. *and other steps*

o We will also remind them that any form of nuclear
cooperation with Iran, including cooperation that is
appropriate for a legitimate, peaceful nuclear program,
would likely be perceived as contributing to a nuclear
weapons capability. This perception would hinder our
efforts to promote nuclear nonproliferation in this
volatile region.